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This research looks into the public debate surrounding the release of proposed 
voluntary National History Standards within the context of the 1990s culture wars in the 
United States. The goal is to offer a glimpse into how history education is tied with 
notions of culture, and how conceptions o f history and national identity were manipulated 
by individuals, spear headed by former NEH chairwoman Lynne Cheney, with a political 
motive. The author gives a brief context o f the United States’ during the mid-1990s, 
including tenuous issues o f race, gender, sexuality and multiculturalism. The origins and 
development of the national history standards are laid out, including the internal debates 
over multiculturalism during their development. The focus shifts to the media attacks a 
number of conservatives launched against the standards, claiming they were too 
culturally liberal, and were an attempt at white washing our nations’ history. It is pointed 
out that these attacks coincided precisely at a pivotal political moment for conservatives
in the Capitol, just at the time of the 1994 Republican takeover of the house, and that 
these attacks on the standards were a way to capitalize on conservatives’ new power. The 
conclusion focuses on the end of the debate after the Senate Resolution in January, 1995. 
The New York Times editorial pages became a hot bed for the debate, and reveal a 
behind-the-scenes connection among the conservatives criticizing the standards, further 
acting as evidence that the conservative assault was coordinated.
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In early October, 1994, after two years of painstaking negotiation and discussion 
went into their development, a set o f voluntary national standards for history in grades 
kindergarten through twelve were set to be published and released to the public. 
Developers hoped that schools would choose to use them as a guideline in their history 
and social studies curriculums, bringing American students up to date on historical 
content as well as critical and analytical skills. This project was part of a larger vision 
which had been known under two different names since 1988: America 2000 and Goals 
2000. Both had as their aim the establishment o f accepted standards in certain core 
subjects in school.
This was not a partisan issue to begin with. After all, it was Republican president 
George H.W. Bush who pushed for it in the 1980s under the name America 2000, and it 
was Democratic president Bill Clinton who continued it in 1994 with only minor changes 
under the name Goals 2000. The subjects o f English, mathematics, science, history and 
geography were to have standards developed for them. Goals 2000 expanded the list of 
subjects to include foreign languages, civics and government, and economics. None of 
them met controversy, except history.
Just before the National Center for History in the Schools (NCHS) was to release 
the mandated history standards to the public, former chairwoman of the National 
Endowment for the Humanities Lynne Cheney attacked them in the Wall Street Journal 
on October 4th, 1994 in an op-ed titled “The End o f History.” This marked the beginning
of a concerted effort by a number o f conservatives to decry, via the media, the history 
standards as wrongheaded at best and aberrantly biased at worst. This offensive would 
ultimately defeat any impact the developers hoped the standards might have on history 
education. What unfolded next ended in a public relations victory for the political right, 
and the short-lived loud debate is a testament to how culture can be open to conscious 
manipulation “from above” by those with means to power and access to media.
There has been a wonderful work on this controversy written by three individuals 
who were involved in most o f the standards’ development. Gary B. Nash, Charlotte 
Crabtree, and Ross E. Dunn published History on Trial: Culture Wars and the Teaching 
o f  the Past in 1998 in order to situate “the attacks on the history standards in the larger 
culture wars o f the last decade” in the hopes that it will allow “a greater appreciate of 
what is at stake and how history education in the schools can be held hostage to political 
agendas.” 1
The authors do a great job o f tracing the development of the standards, and in 
doing so show they know the standards debate was used for political ends. Sometimes the 
authors find it hard to hide their own political biases; and, having been intimately 
invested in the process, they seemingly refuse to admit the Senate censure of the 
standards and its following re-edit by the moderately conservative Council for Basic 
Education (CBE) was an ultimate cultural and political victory for the Right. So 
completely were the original standards politically toxic that even the Democratic 
administration of Bill Clinton would eventually come out against them.
1 Gary Nash, Charlotte Crabtree and Ross E. Dunn, History on Trial (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1998), xi.
To its credit, the focus of History on Trial is how, after all the negative fanfare the 
standards received, the NCHS was able to go back, revise them, and re-release them on 
April 3, 1996. This second version of standards received far less negative attention from 
conservatives. Out o f this second release, Nash, Crabtree, and Dunn chose to find their 
victory. The Senate did not censure or even vote on the revised standards, and they were 
distributed to schools nation-wide. However, the revised standards did not receive nearly 
as much media notice as the first ones did in late 1994 and early ’95. No one paid much 
attention; at this point every media outlet was mostly consumed by the upcoming 
presidential election. In this respect, the history standards and advocates of multicultural 
history lost the public contest. This thesis contends that the fight over public perception 
had been won by the conservative right. By controlling the direction of the media 
conversation over history, conservatives had managed to publicize and find support for 
traditional notions of American themes. And in so doing, derail the standards’ authors’ 
attempts to update school history to be more in line with modem academic historical 
research.
The national history standards controversy o f 1994-1996 also provides us with a 
clear glimpse into how conscious cultural manipulation can occur when put forward by a 
determined institution or group. There was a concerted endeavor by a certain group of 
conservatives to turn the issue o f national history standards into an opportunity to 
influence cultural dialogue; and the mass media o f television, radio and newspapers 
provided the medium for their efforts.
Conceptions of Cultural History
Culture is a slippery term, and depending on who one asks, the definition may 
vary. For the purposes o f this thesis, culture can be construed as shared behaviors and 
basic ideologies that certain people feel distinguish them from other people. Some people 
feel comfortable believing cultures start and stop at national borders, and there are 
debates over what a culture should and should not include.
To assert that the national history standards debate was an effort at conscious 
cultural manipulation through control o f public dialogue is to take a side in the field of 
cultural history. It is important to demarcate the two broadest conceptions o f cultural 
legitimation within the field before one goes further.
A number o f historians and cultural scholars hold a view known as cultural 
populism. According to this analysis, cultural norms and legitimation move generally in a 
bottom-up direction. That is, cultural traditions are born, maintained and challenged 
organically, making it important to investigate things like folklore in earlier societies, and 
not just politics, war and the decrees o f rulers. In studying industrialized societies, the 
analytical focus shifts from folklore to mass popular culture. This includes things like 
films, radio and television shows, music and popular news outlets.
Cultural populists hold that the mass of people in industrialized society have real 
cultural power, producers o f mass media merely respond to the cultural tastes o f the 
populace at large. These cultural norms originate with the masses and are then helped 
spread by mass media, which acted as a reinforcer. Historian Lawrence W. Levine 
epitomized this populist view when he noted, “People did not passively accept whatever
popular culture was thrown their way; they preselected the culture they exposed 
themselves to by learning to decipher reviews and coming attractions, by understanding 
the propensities o f authors, actors, and directors to whose work they had been exposed to 
in the past, and by consulting members of their communities.”2 This alleged agency 
among individuals within the masses translates into power over culture legitimation. 
Their choices force cultural producers to drop certain ideas, to emphasize others and 
adapt to demand. This view o f the power o f the masses conflicts directly with the other 
broad conception o f cultural history: cultural pessimism.
Standing opposite o f cultural populism is an analytical approach which holds that, 
while not totally passive, the masses o f people within a society have much less agency in 
deciding what is part o f accepted culture than the populists posit. Very generally 
construed, true cultural creative power lies with dominant institutions and/or classes that 
are able to control or have productive access to the media and other means of mass 
communication, like the pulpit. In opposition to cultural populism’s “bottom-up” 
approach, cultural pessimists’ methodology is often described as “top-down.” The 
Marxist political theorist Antonio Gramsci is perhaps best known for his theory of 
hegemony, which is used by many cultural pessimists to help explain how culture is 
legitimized and fought over by different classes. Gramsci loosely defined what he meant 
by hegemony when he wrote there is a “‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses 
of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant 
fundamental group; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent
2 Lawrence W. Levine, “The Folklore o f Industrial Society,” The American Historical 
Review {Dec., 1992): 1380.
confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the 
world o f production.”3
Cultural historian T.J. Jackson Lears argued correctly that some have 
misunderstood this as being a black and white relationship. However, the validation and 
imposition of ruling class cultural norms upon society as a whole is often very ambiguous 
and never total. There are always sub-cultural movements vying for substantiation against 
mainstream culture. So, any good pessimist analysis of cultural norms, validation or 
controversy will acknowledge there is room for organic, grassroots agency and action. 
But, it is to hold that the bulk o f cultural creation and legitimation moves in a top-down 
fashion; albeit in a complex give-and-take.4
Michael Denning did well to show this complex tension between ruling class 
culture and its challengers in his book about New Deal era cultural producers, The 
Cultural Front: The Laboring o f  American Culture in the Twentieth Century. Denning 
examined groups o f cultural producers between the 1930s-1945, noting the effects (some 
lasting, some not) that working-class cultural producers had on legitimizing working- 
class culture in mass media. From Orson Welles’ popular front-informed themes to the 
cartoons of radical Disney animators to the witty working-man humor of Will Rogers, 
Denning revealed aspects o f how cultural hegemony had been challenged when those 
from outside the upper-classes got access to cultural outlets like radio, television and the
3 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from  the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quentin Hoare 
and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 12.
4 T.J. Jackson Lears, “The Concept o f Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilites,” 
The American Historical Review 90.3 (1985) 567-93. Lears explores the complexities of 
Gramsci’s theories o f hegemony and their implications for cultural historians.
arts. And in so doing, Denning showed that culture, no matter whether it was mainstream 
or challenging the mainstream, was validated by its producers.5
It is this kind o f top-down cultural legitimation that the national history standards 
debate grants us a glimpse into. The controversy was a battle waged by conservatives in 
influential positions with access to mass media. It was a battle to validate an important 
definer of American identity: our history. And it was a success as far as public perception 
was concerned.
The Context
To understand how a controversy over national history standards was so quick to 
become a media phenomenon and a tool for cultural manipulation by well-placed 
conservatives, it is important to understand the media-hyped cultural terrain the standards 
were entering into by looking at the issues involved and some analyses that have tried to 
explain just why the culture wars occurred in the first place.
During the 1980s and ‘90s, there was a palpable conflict raging in America 
known as the culture wars. Broadly speaking, the culture wars are commonly thought of 
as having involved general cultural issues like gender roles, race and sexuality. The 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey Supreme court case of 1992 and the direct approaches that 
anti-abortion groups like Operation Rescue took by protesting abortion clinics
5 Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: The Laboring o f  American Culture in the 
Twentieth Century (London: Verso, 1998).
reinvigorated the cultural debate over abortion. Women’s rights and their societal role in 
general were also brought to the public cultural fore.
Supreme Court cases like United States v. Virginia in 1996, which struck down 
the long standing male only admissions at the Virginia Military Institute, and the 1991 
confirmation hearings for Justice Clarence Thomas publicized the issue of sexual 
discrimination and harassment in American culture. Thomas was accused by former 
colleague Anita Hill o f sexually harassing her and other female colleagues in the past.
The media coverage o f this woman standing up in front o f cameras and having the 
courage to publicly accuse a powerful man o f harassment had a huge effect. In 1991, 
before the case, 6,127 sexual harassment complaints were filed with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. Every year afterwards that number increased, and 
in 1996 it reached 15,342.6
While the issue of sexuality became a pillar o f the culture wars, it was not always 
about women. A polarized national dialogue to determine the place of homosexuality in 
U.S. culture was driven by the rising HIV and AIDS epidemics; the push by gay rights 
activists for the legalization o f gay marriage; Bill Clinton’s pledge to overturn the ban 
against gays serving in the military which eventually led to the compromise policy of 
“Don’t ask, Don’t tell;” and the horrific 1998 torture and death of Matthew Shepard in 
Laramie, Wyoming all helped open a public discussion concerning the place of 
homosexuality within culture.
6 “Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill Supreme Court Confirmation Hearing ‘Empowered 
Women’ and Panel Member Arlen Specter Still Amazed by Reactions,” ABC World 
News with Diane Sawyer, last modified October 24, 2011,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/clarence-thomas-anita-hill-supreme-court-confirmation-
hearing/story?id=14802217&page=2#.UUxmtBysiSo.
Race, a volatile issue at times in American history once again exploded back into 
the cultural consciousness in 1992 with the Los Angeles Race Riots, sparked by the 
acquittal of four white police officers charged with assault and excessive use of force 
during the arrest o f Rodney King, a black man. The acquittals struck many black 
Americans as racially influenced, as ten o f the twelve jurors were white, leading to four 
days o f violence and looting, leaving fifty-three people dead. Race was sure to stay on the 
cultural debate docket with court cases in the mid-‘90s like Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena and Hopwood v. University o f Texas Law School, both arguing for and against the 
use of Affirmative Action in the workplace and school, respectively.
Historiography
These cultural controversies that came to the public fore in the 1990s covered the 
three biggest, most publicized issues brought up in contemporary works on the culture 
debates: women’s rights, gay rights, and racial tensions. The fractures within American 
culture that led to these sharp societal divisions were in the making long before the 
1990s; but, it wasn’t until the publication o f James Davison Hunter’s 1991 work, Culture 
Wars: The Struggle to Define America gave a name to the growing cultural partisanship 
in America that journalists, politicians and public figures began to discuss the issues as 
subsets o f a larger, self-conscious “culture war.” From that point on, whether the culture 
wars were unique and deserving o f special epochal status or not, the media’s coverage of 
these controversies as a “war” over culture reinforced the perception that it was distinct.
In his work, Hunter set the tone for the nineties by dividing the United States into 
two new and growing antagonistic philosophies he dubbed “progressive” and 
“orthodox.”7 Hunter noted a shift from worldviews based on ethno-centricities and 
religion that tenuously co-existed (Catholics, Protestants, Jews) toward a nation in which 
two hostile worldviews brought people from different faiths together, but pitted 
secularists and liberal believers of different faiths against a bloc of conservatives 
belonging to different faiths (progressive Catholics vs. pre-Vatican II Catholics,
Orthodox Jews vs. reform Jews, etc.). Hunter argued that this effect was highly polarizing 
because the dividing lines involved uncompromising positions on social issues. This 
polarization was squeezing and drowning out those who stood in the cultural and political 
middle ground, making conciliation much harder than it had been in the past.
In the years immediately following, a number o f scholars took up the theme and 
published works that attempted to explain the perceived cultural polarity. In 1992, 
political commentator E.J. Dionne Jr. published Why Americans Hate Politics, in which 
he blamed both major parties for the hyper-polarization of the 1980s and 1990s by 
focusing on cultural issues that many Americans remained personally undecided on, 
running overtly polarized campaigns, using sound-bite political advertisements and 
diversionary dramatic presidential debates.8
Four years later, sociologist Todd Gitlin published The Twilight o f  Common 
Dreams. The author used the Oakland textbook adoption controversy of 1990 to make a 
larger point. The specific controversy focused on a group of predominantly African-
7 James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: 
BasicBooks, 1991).
8 E. J. Dionne, Why Americans Hate Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).
American parents, allied with a number o f former Left wing activists who accused Gary 
Nash, a white, former Left wing activist (and a major player in our main drama four years 
later), of having authored a racist history textbook. This issue was important because 
Nash’s textbook was the only one up for adoption in the city. Oakland’s school system 
eventually voted not to adopt it based on the controversy surrounding it, leaving the city 
temporarily without a history textbook. Gitlin pointed out that while the controversy 
became vitriolic in debates and school meetings, the larger issue of continued slashing of 
education funds by the state was never brought up for serious debate. This went directly 
to his main argument that the so-called Culture Wars served as a diversion from real 
economic issues that faced Americans o f all cultural identities.9
Gitlin determined that the distracting, uncompromising political and cultural 
landscape o f the 1990s was caused by the ideological shifts during the 1960s and 1970s 
within both liberal and conservative camps. The mainstream liberals, Gitlin argued, had 
stopped focusing on common equality for all and had instead focused on affirming 
distinct cultures within the United States, which had the negative effect o f highlighting 
cultural differences between people and led to in-fighting among those on the Left. The 
conservatives had shifted the other way. Once the party associated with entrepreneurs and 
the economically privileged, the Republican Party had been slowly transformed by 
neoconservatives into the party o f the common good; but this conservative conception of 
public good involved pushing for individual rights over universal equality. Left in the
9 Todd Gitlin, The Twilight o f  Common Dreams: Why America Is Wracked by Culture 
Wars (New York: Metropolitan, 1995).
wake of this Left wing in-fighting and evolving conservative ideology was a nation 
unable to reach any sort of broad cultural consensus.
In 2004, journalist Thomas Frank published the popular work, What's the Matter 
with Kansas?: How Conservatives Won the Heart o f  America, which would later be 
turned into a film o f the same name. Frank focused his work on the state o f Kansas, using 
it as a microcosm of the Midwest in general. He investigated why working class voters in 
this one-time bastion of agrarian populism and stronghold of the Democratic Party had, 
by the end of the century, turned a political 180° and become a stalwart Republican base. 
Frank, in the same vein as Dionne and Gitlin, proposed that the causes rested in the major 
parties’ changing ideologies; except in Frank’s analyses most of the blame lay with the 
Democratic Party. Whereas many working class voters had voted for the left-wing, pro­
labor economic policies of New Deal Democrats earlier in the 20th Century, they became 
alienated by the conservative economic agenda embraced by the Democratic Leadership 
Council in the 1990s. Conciliation between Kansans and the Democratic Party became 
even less likely as the Party’s evolving social liberalism was not shared by culturally 
traditional Midwesterners. No longer able to identify with the Party of the Left many 
working class voters cast their lot with the Republican Party: a Party that was often at 
odds with many working Kansans’ economic interests, but supported the traditional 
social values they held in high esteem.10
While these works recognized and delved into the palpable rift in American 
culture and politics, the authors offered overly simplistic explanations. Hunter’s attempt
10 Thomas Frank, What's the Matter with Kansas?: How Conservatives Won the Heart o f  
America (New York: Metropolitan, 2004).
to divide the nation along progressive and orthodox lines was a good start at analysis, but 
tried to explain a complex phenomenon while focusing mainly on ethnic and religious 
affiliations. Dionne, Gitlin and Frank did well to address how changing ideological 
emphases in both major parties alienated or confused many of their supporters. But, like 
Hunter before them, they painted a simple picture of causation that is top-down, as 
changes in political party agendas and thought trickle down to affect the populace at 
large. On top o f that, where Hunter was able to remain largely unbiased in his is 
treatment of the “progressives” and “orthodox,” the last three authors were left-leaning 
liberals who struggled to understand how the liberal consensus culture of mid-20th 
Century America, which had embodied their own political sentiments, had been shattered 
and polarized in the face of an aggressive neoconservative ascendency. Frank betrayed 
his bias more than the others by going on to propose that perhaps the Democrats could 
recapture the heartland with a sharp turn to the economic Left.
Neither Hunter, Dionne, nor Frank made any serious note of the contentious 
debate over history standards during the Culture Wars of the 1990s. Hunter and Dionne 
couldn’t have, as the issue of history in schools had yet to develop when they published 
their works. And perhaps Frank did not see debates over history as relevant to his 
investigations into the changing political landscape o f the Midwest, though a perceived 
attack on American history by liberals certainly wouldn’t have helped Democrats in that 
region. For those authors, the cultural combativeness at the end of the century was either 
due to ruptures and realignments within religious communities, or the changing agendas 
and ideologies o f the two major parties. In their analyses, the national history standards 
debate would seem like nothing more than an outlet o f one o f the two previously
mentioned prime drivers. While Gitlin focused part of his study on the Oakland history 
textbook controversy of 1990, in the end he saw the debates over history, and the culture 
wars themselves, as a distraction from the important issues facing Americans; rather than 
a powerful tool and telling symptom of a deep cultural identity crisis.
As time passed and scholars became more detached from the events of the 
previous decade, a few historians entered the fray of 1990s cultural analyses. The number 
of history books that touch on the topic remain sparse but there are two notable 
exceptions. In 2010, historian David T. Courtwright published No Right Turn: 
Conservative Politics in Liberal America. He argues that, although there has been an 
undeniable conservative ascendency in American politics since Nixon’s presidency, this 
swing towards the Right has not been as complete as many scholars have argued. The 
author claims conservatives successfully used contentious cultural issues to divide and 
conquer the New Deal coalition; but, when put in power, these same conservatives 
mainly focused on effecting economic policies, not cultural ones. Courtwright’s history 
analyzes the rise of the Right and the effective tool that cultural issues played in this 
ascendency, painting the culture wars as an outgrowth of conservative political strategy 
more than as an actual crisis o f identity.11
The most pivotal work of history on the culture wars to date is Daniel Rodgers’ 
Age o f  Fracture. Published in 2010, Rodgers bookended his fractious era between the 
1970s, after the postwar boom, and September 11, 2001. The author announced that it 
had been a time o f reorientation o f collective identity away from the solid, common
11 David T. Courtwright, No Right Turn: Conservative Politics in a Liberal America 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2010).
belief in American institutions and society, towards a new, de-centered emphasis on the 
individualized experiences o f the world, loosely based around the emergence of “the 
market” as a powerful abstract idea. Rodgers looked at presidential speeches, economic 
tracts and other scholarly works from the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, analyzing the words 
and metaphors used in order to gauge the changing public perception o f American culture 
and ideology. Such a methodology forced Rodgers to look at many aspects of life such as 
the cultural, social, political and economic, and his work is an elucidating read for anyone 
interested in the culture wars. But, with such a broad array of topics to include, one 
cannot be surprised that Rodgers’ focus on debates over the kind of history taught in 
classrooms consists of only a few pages; with the 1994-95 debate over history standards 
encompassing just a paragraph.12
With a number of differing evaluations as to what the culture wars meant and 
what the root causes were, it’s important that investigations into this era continue. And, 
with little recent scholarship existing on the history standards controversy, it presents 
itself as a pivotal topic o f study which this paper will address.
Whether the culture wars of the 1990s were actually unique and existed as a kind 
o f Kantian noumenal thing-in-itself, or if  they were merely hyped phenomena o f separate 
cultural issues used by political players and those in media does not matter. What does 
matter is perception, and the public did and does still perceive the 1990s to be a period 
that stands apart from other eras due to its intense confrontations over accepted cultural 
norms, and how they should be enforced. And that perception o f heightened cultural 
divide led to real political and cultural consequences in America.
12 Daniel T. Rodgers, Age o f  Fracture (Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2011).
The national history standards controversy of 1994-1996 is a great example of 
top/down cultural manipulation. It was started and used by conservatives in a perceived 
culturally polarized environment in order to steer public opinion in their favor and to take 
control over an academic field many on the right feared was swaying too far left in its 
methodology and worldview. History was and remains an important foothold in the battle 
to define culture, and this battle was one definite victory for conservatives in a long, 
sporadic war of ideas.
CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORY OF CONTROVERSY
In 1983, the National Commission on Excellence in Education released a damning 
report to the Undersecretary of Education on the state o f education in the United States. 
Within its 48 pages, the commission examined four categories of the educational system: 
content, expectations, time and teaching. All categories were found to be lacking. 
America’s content was “a cafeteria style curriculum in which the appetizers and desserts 
can easily be mistaken for the main courses.”1 The expectations placed on students were 
not high enough, as evidenced by unchallenging textbooks and decreased amounts of 
homework. The commission also found that the United States spent markedly less time 
on instruction than other industrialized nations. And, when it came to teachers, the 
commission noted many teachers were taught too much about educational theory and not 
enough about content. Finally there were shortages o f teachers for mathematics and the 
sciences.2
The report warned o f a two-fold effect these perceived deficiencies could have on 
American culture. “What lies behind this emerging national sense of frustration can be 
described as both a dimming o f personal expectations and the fear o f  losing a shared 
vision fo r  America.”3 And when defining personal ends in education, the report phrased 
them clearly as economic expectations:
1 The National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation At Risk: The 
Imperative fo r  Educational Reform (U.S. Department of Education, 1983), p. 17, 18.
2 The National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk.
3 The National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation At Risk, p. 13. 
(Emphasis added).
More and more young people emerge from high school ready 
neither for college nor for work. This predicament becomes more acute 
as the knowledge base continues its rapid expansion, the number of 
traditional jobs shrinks, and new jobs demand greater sophistication 
and preparation.4
It is clear from the start, when it came to education reform that those in positions 
o f power were not concerned with improving learning for learning’s sake; but rather they 
sought improved education for economic and cultural reasons. There is a debate to be had 
over whether public education should be developed with economic success as the goal, or 
if  it should stand as important unto itself for an individual’s discovery o f self and the 
world. For the purposes of this paper though, the emphasis on history education’s role in 
forming a unified vision of America is the main concern, and reveals why the national 
history standards were fodder in the 1990’s battles over the nation’s political culture. To 
control the message that history education conveys to students is to control an effective 
tool in the war to define the unifying themes o f America’s culture. And having control 
over a nation’s unifying cultural themes is to have a powerful sway when it comes to 
policy making.
The History of History
History education is no stranger to ideological battles. In his analysis of the 
secondary education in France, Emile Durkheim showed how classical education as early
as the 17th Century served the socio-political needs o f the Catholic Church.5 In the United 
States, a number o f scholars and historians have shown how history education and texts 
have been scrutinized and debated for their political biases over and again, often serving 
or assuming underlying ideological premises.
In a 1979 article for the Harvard Educational Review, Jean Anyon investigated 
seventeen recent history textbooks’ portrayal o f American history, 1865-1917. She found 
almost all the textbooks referred to the first years o f the 20th Century before World War I 
as “progressive,” and portrayed the trust-busting o f Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson as radical 
reform of big business. This imparted to the students that the period was full of 
responsible governance keeping business in check. None o f the textbooks even 
acknowledged the argument made by many historians well before 1979 that the period 
spoken o f was actually conservative in the sense that anti-trust laws served merely to 
maintain the power o f big business.6 In conclusion, Anyon found “school curriculum has 
contributed to the formation of attitudes that make it easier for powerful groups, those 
whose knowledge is legitimized by school studies, to manage and control society.”7 
While Jean Anyon pointed out ways that symbolic language and underlying 
assumptions in textbooks can impart ideological biases onto the student, Frances 
Fitzgerald noted in her book, America Revised, how conscious external pressure on 
publishers can also nudge ideology into history textbooks. She cited one example from
5 See: Emile Durkheim, The Evolution o f  Educational Thought: Lectures on the 
Formation and Development o f  Secondary Education in France, trans. Peter Collins 
(Boston, Mass.: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1977).
6 Jean Anyon, “Ideology and United States History Textbooks,” Harvard Educational 
Review vol. 49 no. 3 (1979): 366-377.
7 Anyon, “Ideology and United States History Textbooks,” 382.
1961 when a right-wing group called Texans for America intimidated a textbook 
adoption committee and pressed a number o f publishers to make changes in history 
school books. As a result, “the Silver Burdett Company took out two passages concerning 
the need for the United States to maintain friendly relations with other countries and the 
possibility that some countries would occasionally disagree with us and substituted 
passages saying that some countries were less free than the United States.”8 It is obvious 
the ambiguous word “free” in this context was to be understood by students as “right;” 
and thus, a fringe right-wing ideological belief was presented to school children, 
disguised as objectivity.
From the symbolic words and assumptions textbooks include to the pressure 
exerted on committees and publishers to present certain sides, it is becoming clearer how 
ideology has inserted itself into history education through the 20th Century. This may or 
may not be surprising. As E.H. Carr, R.G. Collingwood and others have forcefully argued 
in their works discussing how history is made and written, a historian cannot separate 
him or herself totally from the topic they are investigating. There is always a piece of the 
present in any history work, including textbooks, and this means that ideological 
preferences are almost inevitable.9 That is not to say historians try to or do not care if 
they introduce their ideological biases into their work; but, it is accepted in the field that 
to do historical work is to criticize, interpret and emphasize, which all require a conscious 
agent who naturally holds opinions and deep-seeded beliefs. It is this view on history 
which helps explain why it is still a relevant subject for the present and useful for
8 Frances Fitzgerald, America Revised (Vintage Books: New York, 1980), 34.
9 See E.H. Carr, What is History? (Penguin: London, 1961). Also see R.G. Collingwood, 
The Idea o f  History (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1946).
students to learn. It also, however, reveals why history can be such a dangerous weapon 
when it is presented as objective and immutable truth.
Therefore, it is not surprising to learn certain ideological biases are found in 
textbooks. While ideally they are muted and kept to a minimum, sometimes they slip in. 
However, when they are consciously pushed into textbooks by interest and political 
groups, like in Fitzgerald’s 1961 example, educators and historians are dismayed. But, 
there is an even deeper relationship between ideology and history education that dates 
back to the formation of its modem form.
In 1983, Michael Lybarger investigated the creation of modem social studies and 
published an article in the History o f  Education Quarterly entitled “Origins o f the 
Modem Social Studies: 1900-1916.” Lybarger, as did the originators o f social studies, 
defined the subject as an amalgamation o f history, economics, political science and 
civics. Lybarger in large part traced the goals of modern social studies curriculum to the 
1916 publication o f The Social Studies in Secondary Education, a report prepared by the 
Committee on Social Studies. This committee was headed by Thomas Jesse Jones who 
had guided the creation o f social studies at the Hampton Institute, a school for blacks.
The 1916 report borrowed many o f its ideas largely from those used at Hampton Institute, 
which encouraged students to be obedient, “more patient under pressure, and more 
hopeful as to the future.”10 Jones, a supporter o f Booker T. Washington and his views, 
also hoped that new students of social studies would also imbibe a “belief in the 
inevitability o f progress.”11 These convictions, to be taught in social studies (including
10 Michael Lybarger, “Origins o f Modem Social Studies: 1900-1916,” History o f  
Education Quarterly vol. 23, No. 4 (1983): 463.
11 Lybarger, “Modem Social Studies,” 462.
history), would develop an individual better suited for industrial and agricultural work. In 
fact, the Committee members were convinced the new subject ought to prepare the 
student for a life o f hard work. As the report was published, Lybarger noted that “James 
Lynn Barnard promised the American Academy o f Social and Political Science, ‘... boys 
and girls will acquire a profound respect for hard work, no matter what the trade or 
profession followed, and a contempt only for laziness and inefficiency.’” 12
Lybarger contended that these three ideological assumptions: tolerance of 
oppression, hope in the future and inevitability o f progress were pillars in the foundation 
o f modem social studies taught in schools. If this is the case, not only is ideology present 
in the textbooks America’s students have read, both as underlying assumptions and 
consciously forced agendas; but, a 20th century ideology conducive to business and 
liberal notions exists in the very groundwork modern social studies (history included) 
springs out of.
While this has tended to be the case in most mainstream history textbooks, the 
underlying support for the American system has not kept them safe from ideological 
critics. In 1922, a book by Historian David Muzzey came under fire after having been a 
popular textbook choice for the previous eleven years. Charles Grant Miller, a writer for 
Hearst newspapers, published a piece entitled Treason to American Tradition: The Spirit 
o f  Benedict Arnold Reincarnated in United States History Revised in Textbooks. In his 
work, Miller attacked Muzzey’s textbook, An American History as so biased that it must 
be pulled from all classrooms. American history with dangerous distortions that would 
negatively influence students’ notions o f America.
12 Ibid. 464.
Having been published in 1922, shortly after the Bolshevik victory in Russia and 
the 1919 Red Scare in America, one might plausibly attribute this attack on history 
textbooks as an expression of anti-communism. This would be wrong. Miller was 
attacking Muzzey’s pro-British distortions. Analyzing An American History’s handling of 
opinions o f the Revolution, Miller noted that Muzzey gave examples of an American 
against the Revolution and a British man who was in favor o f it at the time. Miller’s 
criticism? “Muzzey does not distinguish which of the two opinions was right and which 
was wrong.”13 This omission by Muzzey, along with the omissions of “Nathan Hale, 
Anthony Wayne, Putnam, Sumter, Pickens, Marion, Stark, Sullivan, and Knox”14 and 
others, is evidence in the eyes of Miller of the author’s unpatriotic pro-British bent. This 
tactic of criticizing a textbook’s omissions would arise again in the 1990s history 
standards debate.
As the 20th century progressed, instances o f history textbooks being criticized or 
censored for including anti-American ideology continued. Famous Historian Harold 
Rugg was attacked by the National Republic in 1936 for “Sovietizing our children” with 
his history books.15 In 1940, National Association o f Manufacturers’ president H.W. 
Prentis Jr. proclaimed “our free institutions and the heroes o f the American republic have 
been derided and debunked by a host o f puny iconoclasts, who destroy since they cannot 
build,” he then sent out 6,830 “sentinels” across the nation to sniff out unpatriotic history
13 Charles Grant Miller, Treason to American Tradition: The Spirit o f  Benedict Arnold 
Reincarnated in United States History Revised in Textbooks (Sons of the Revolution in 
the State of California, 1922), 13.
14 Ibid.
15 Dan W. Gilbert, “Sovietizing Our Children,” National Republic, August 24, 1936, 16.
books.16 Censorship o f educators in the name of education became so intense in the 
1950s that “more than half the states required teachers to sign loyalty oaths;” and books 
like Progressive Education is REDucation often portrayed interpretations by historians 
like George Counts, Charles Beard and Harold Rugg as unpatriotic, if  not pro­
communist.17
As more and more instances of controversy surrounding history textbooks arose, 
the more cautious publishing houses chose not to offend any textbook audiences and their 
parents. This helped the emerging dominance of consensus theory history in academia 
and school history textbooks throughout the 1940s and 1950s. Consensus historians’ 
underlying philosophy was that in the history of America there was never any real 
ideological conflict. They held that, despite there being radicals on the fringe of its 
politics, America had continually progressed along a classic liberal trajectory. A well- 
known example o f consensus history is Louis Hartz’s 1955 work, The Liberal Tradition 
in America. In it, Hartz proposed that there is lack o f divisive ideologies in the United 
States. This is partly due to the lack o f a feudal past in America, which has spared its 
political development any conflict with an internal conservative establishment, and has 
allowed a Lockean liberalism to hold firm in the political minds of its inhabitants, 
uninterrupted from the Revolution right through to his present tim e.18
As social histories about Black Americans, women and the working classes were 
starting to pop up in the universities during the 1950s, the introduction of social history
16 Nash, Crabtree, Dunn, History On Trial, 44.
17 Ibid, 68.
18 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (Harcourt, Brace: New York, 1955). 
Other Examples o f Consensus historians are Richard Hofstadter, The American Political 
Tradition (1948); Daniel J. Boorstin, The Genius o f  American Politics (1953); and David 
Potter, People o f  Plenty (1954).
into school textbooks came at a slow trickle due to publishing companies reticence at 
adding anything that might catch the eye o f civic clubs like the John Birch Society, the 
American Legion or the Daughters o f the American Revolution.
Then the turbulent 1960s reared its head. The civil rights movement encouraged 
the NAACP in 1962 to successfully request that the Detroit city school system remove a 
history textbook published by the Laidlaw Brothers, because it contained racial prejudice. 
This victory encouraged other organizations concerned with racial issues to start 
investigating textbooks for racism. The B’nai Brith’s Anti-Defamation League and the 
Council on Interracial Books analyzed texts to make sure they treated minorities with 
fairness.19
By the 1970s, both race and gender started to appear more often in history 
textbooks. Publishers even developed certain guidelines to follow so as to avoid 
appearing racist or sexist in their texts. “The Holt, Rinehart & Winston guidelines on 
gender, for instance,” wrote historian Frances Fitzgerald in 1980, “include such strictures 
as ‘Avoid ‘the founding fathers,’ use ‘the founders.’ [...] To avoid ethnic stereotyping, its 
guidelines warn against the overuse o f names like ‘Mary’ and ‘John’ and the use of only 
one ethnic name in lists o f arbitrarily chosen names.”20
The Push for Standards
With these brief examples, it is clear how ideology has constantly influenced 
history education; and it is easy to understand how the national history standards would
19 Frances Fitzgerald, America Revised (Vintage Books, New York: 1980), 38-39.
20 Fitzgerald, America Revised, 41.
become an ideological controversy in 1994. Starting after the release of A Nation at Risk, 
a push for standards-based education reform became a hot issue for both the George 
H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations. In 1989, the administration of George H.W. 
Bush teamed up with the National Governors’ Association to develop six National 
Education Goals, which Bush announced in his 1990 State of the Union Address. Goal 
three proposed that “American students will leave grades four, eight, and twelve having 
demonstrated competency in challenging subject matter including English, mathematics, 
science, history, and geography.”21 These goals were uncontroversial enough to pass and 
became known as America 2000, setting into motion the production process of the 
national history standards.
Two years later in 1992, congress followed suit and supported the development of 
national standards for five core disciplines, including history. These standards were to be 
voluntary for schools and national in development, instead of mandatory and federal, 
respectively. Funding was to come from private and public means, in an attempt to stave 
off any possible controversy over there being too much government control of education. 
Because it funded almost half of the project, the National Endowment for the Humanities 
(NEH) oversaw the history standards project and awarded the bulk of its development to 
the National Center for History in the Schools (NCHS), a cooperative research program 
at UCLA. Directors o f the NCHS, Charlotte Crabtree and Gary Nash, put together a 
number o f councils and panels featuring a wide variety o f participants. Involved in the 
national history standards project were presidents o f history organizations, county and
21 U.S. Department of Education, National Goals fo r  Education (U.S. Department of 
Education, 1990), 1.
city school district staff, teachers, history scholars, as well as representatives of twenty- 
four education and public interest associations.22
This wide inclusion of representatives from differing worldviews (from the 
National Catholic Educational Association to the Native American Heritage Commission 
to the National Alliance of Black School Educators) was intentional and not surprising, 
considering the tide o f multiculturalism that had become a contentious cultural view of 
America during the 1990s. Nash and Crabtree, two leaders of the project, agreed that 
individuals involved in the shaping of the standards “should represent a wide range of 
interests and perspectives among scholars, teachers, and advocates of history education.
[...] The composition o f the council was crucial,” they wrote, “ .. .a look around the table 
at the first meeting o f the forum revealed a microcosm of America itself.”23 They went on 
to mention their inclusion of representatives o f Catholics, Native Americans, Lutherans, 
Asian and Pacific Americans, and African Americans. They included “Academic 
historians as well as teachers, women as well as men, and people o f differing views on 
the history wars under way since the 1980s.” As many invested in history education saw 
it at the time there was finally a chance to rewrite on a massive scale the story o f America 
taught to millions of school children. Nash and Crabtree noted, “those who were at first 
reluctant about the wisdom of this enterprise soon decided that they might compromise 
their own best interests if they failed to join in.”24 It is in this intentional establishment of 
multicultural panels that one can find the impact the concurrent culture wars had on the 
development of the standards.
22 Gary B. Nash, Charlotte Crabtree, Ross E. Dunn, History on Trial (Knopf: New York, 
1998), 159.
23 Nash, Crabtree, Dun, History on Trial, 159.
24 Ibid., 158.
Cultural Context and Its Effect
As discussed in the last chapter, the nation was going through a self-perceived 
culture war during this time. The works mentioned before about the culture wars and 
others were written to figure out what this “war” really entailed, and whether it was 
started as purely a cultural debate or was instigated by politics masquerading as culture. 
Either way, the issues labeled as culture war issues had a real impact on how Americans 
thought about themselves, their communities and country. In the same way that historians 
o f the 19th and mid-20th centuries had betrayed biases and opinions of their time in their 
work, so too did the authors of the standards have to deal with issues o f the culture wars 
while creating a new vision for history in schools. Certain hot-button issues at the time 
that ideally would have nothing to do with creating history curriculums expressed 
themselves and exerted certain pressures that the formative committees could not but help 
to address. In this way, history is never free from the present it is written in.
Understanding how a given political cultural climate can influence the process of 
developing a history curriculum will help elucidate the movement through which political 
culture can be changed. The efforts by conservatives to use the history standards as a 
punching bag were motivated in part by a desire to gain a cultural victory over 
proponents of an ideology they did not like, and which had crept into the standards: 
multiculturalism. Almost immediately after Cheney started the conservatives’ attacks, 
they were met by a backlash by the standards’ supporters and champions of 
multiculturalism, opening up a media space in which the past and present of American
culture was to be fought over in a way as to grab the public’s attention and manipulate 
their cultural heart strings. But even before the attacks flew, and before the standards 
were close to being finished, multiculturalism had been an issue grappled by those on the 
standards’ committees, because it was a hot-button issue in America as a whole at the 
time.
In purposely teaming the councils involved in developing the standards with 
representatives of different cultural worldviews, Gary Nash and Charlotte Crabtree were 
influenced by multiculturalism. There are two usages o f the word multiculturalism. The 
first use is descriptive, and denotes a single community or nation with cultural diversity 
among its residents. This was broadly accepted by most as a fact in America by the 
1990s. This view does not lend opinion to the question o f whether cultural diversity is 
good or bad, healthy or symptomatic of a problem; it merely states a demographic 
phenomenon.
The second use o f the term “multiculturalism” is more standard-bearing, and 
represents an ideology that believes cultural diversity is a good thing, and healthy for a 
nation. It is this second use, that of multiculturalism as an ideology, that was fought over 
and debated during the culture wars. And it is this ideology that was inherently supported 
by Crabtree and Nash when they intentionally built the standards project’s councils with 
representatives of different cultural worldviews. That is one way the culture wars affected 
the standards: in the very make-up of those people involved in their development.
That is not where the influence stopped. The battle over multiculturalism in 
education was a major conflict in the culture wars at the end of the last century. In 1991 
Hunter wrote how debates over multicultural curriculum in schools should be construed
as culture war, citing controversies at Stanford, University o f Wisconsin, Columbia and 
other campuses over required ethnic studies courses.25 Some conservatives had been 
weary o f school curriculum as a bastion of liberal bias as early as 1971, when Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court, Lewis F. Powell warned conservative colleagues in a 
confidential memorandum about assaults on the American free enterprise system, 
including liberal academics on campuses. Powell asserted that “members o f the 
intellectual community are waging ideological warfare against the enterprise system and 
the values of western society.”26 He specifically claimed that “Social science faculties 
(the political scientist, economist, sociologist and many o f the historians) tend to be 
liberally oriented.”27 He worried about the effects these liberal educators would have on 
the youths’ minds. Powell’s answer to this problem was to wage a war o f the minds. He 
encouraged the Chamber of Commerce to establish a staff o f scholars who believe in 
traditional American values and economics, as well as to evaluate textbooks for anti- 
American system bias. Powell went on to propose the establishment o f conservative, pro- 
free enterprise think tanks to help with the ideological war America was gripped in.28
With such intense worry and attention by conservatives about ideological bias in 
education since the 1970s, and with the advent o f the divide over multiculturalism in 
school curriculums in the 1980s, it is no surprise that it would arise as a major debate
25 James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: 
BasicBooks, 1991)215-220.
26 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., “Attack on American Free Enterprise System,” memorandum to 
the Education Committee of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 1971, 5. 
http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%20Archives/PowellMemorandumTypescript.pdf
27 Powell, Jr., “Attack on American Free Enterprise System,” 13.
http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%20Archives/PowellMemorandumTypescript.pdf
during the forums to decide what kind of histories should be included in the standards 
between 1992 and 1994.
In April 1992, at the very first meeting o f the National Council for History 
Standards, multiculturalism became a sticking point. So apparent was the rift that 
Education Week, a weekly newspaper devoted to the field o f education, ran an article 
entitled “Issue of Multiculturalism Dominates Standards Debate.”29 Council members 
such as Mabel Lake Murray, Cynthia Neverdon-Morton and Sam Banks argued that a 
multicultural perspective was necessary if the council was going to develop standards that 
presented accurate history that included more than just a white perspective.30 A small 
conservative bloc, consisting partially o f Mark Curtis o f the Atlantic Council o f the 
United States and Chester Finn, professor o f education and public policy, stated their fear 
that such a multicultural education might “threaten to balkanize American society,” 
because it would “serve to drive people apart and will diminish the critical importance of 
teaching about our common American heritage.”31
The United States history standards’ development was not the only one to be 
racked by multicultural division. The council striving to create world history standards 
also found itself faced with a deep split over the perspective schools should take and the 
goals they should have in teaching history that supposedly covered the whole world. One 
side o f the argument was made up o f traditionalists like Lynne Cheney, William Bennett, 
and Allan Bloom. They argued that the proposed world history standards should take a 
markedly pro-Western focus, educating students on the roots and development of
29 Debra Viadero, “Issue o f Multiculturalism Dominates Standards Debate,” Education 
Week, April 22, 1992, 18.
30 Nash, Crabtree, Dunn, History on Trial, 160, 161.
Western thought and traditions from ancient Greece through Rome, Europe, and up to 
America’s shores. This view intertwined with an anti-multicultural point of view in the 
sense that it conceptualized American history and culture as having a unified theme that 
could be historically traced back to Europe. It is also centered on perceived notions of 
Western traditions and did not acknowledge the traditions of non-Western cultures.32
Other scholars, like William McNeill, representatives o f the American Historical 
Association, Marilyn Jo Hitchens o f the World History Association and Nguyen Minh 
Chau of the National Association for Asian and Pacific American Education all disagreed 
with the idea of Western-centered standards for world history. Unfortunately for them, 
they had trouble agreeing amongst themselves how a non-western centered set of 
standards would be organized; but it is clear in Nash and Crabtree’s account that these 
individuals wished for a world history that sanctioned a multicultural perspective, 
acknowledging not just western traditions, but many others including African and 
Asian.33 This led to months o f debate and wrangling amongst members of the council on 
world history.
Both issues o f whether the US standards should emphasize the diversity of 
cultural perspectives in America’s past and whether the world history standards should 
emphasize western culture or not can be traced back to the contentious cultural debates of 
the 1980s and 1990s. With the debate of multiculturalism still raging in society at large, it 




Unlike the American public, it took just a little over a month for the authors of the 
United States history standards to find a compromise on the issue of multiculturalism. In 
May o f 1992, the authors agreed on two criteria. One, that the “history of any society can 
only be understood by studying all its constituent parts. [...] Standards for United States 
history should reflect the nation’s diversity,” an obvious nod to proponents of a 
multicultural perspective. However, to appease those who wished to see a unified 
American cultural tradition taught in schools, the authors included that “Standards in 
United States history should contribute to citizenship education through developing 
understanding of our common civic identity and shared civic values within the polity.”34 
Those educators and historians involved in creating the world history standards 
were not so fortunate. The debate over taking a Western-oriented approach or taking an 
approach that emphasized the multitude of national and cultural histories from around the 
world lasted from April of 1992 until it was finally and uneasily resolved in June of 1993. 
It was then that the council adopted the much mediated and edited compromise dubbed 
Criterion 13, which stated “Standards in world history should treat the history and values 
o f diverse civilizations, including those o f the West, and should especially address the 
interactions among them.”35
After the debates over how far a multicultural perspective would be permitted in 
both the United States and world history standards, Nash, Crabtree, and most others 
involved in their development thought the issue was finally overcome. Little could they 
have known that just a year and a half later, after the conservatives in Congress became
34 Joint meeting of the National Council for History Standards and the National Forum 
for History Standards, audiocassette of meeting, April 10, 1992; as quoted in Nash, 
Crabtree, Dunn, History on Trial, 164-165.
35 Nash, Crabtree, Dunn, History on Trial, 174.
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emboldened with significant gains in both House and Senate seats, this issue would come 
back to haunt them. Attacking conservatives took issue mainly with the amount of 
multiculturalism perceived to be in the standards. And it was this issue which would 
ultimately bring the history standards to their knees, and afford conservative cultural 
warriors a valuable victory in early 1995.
The historians discussed earlier in this chapter - Muzzey, Rugg, Beard, the 
consensus historians o f the 1950s; all were just as affected by their contemporary cultural 
situations as those who suddenly faced debates over multiculturalism in historical 
perspective during the developmental processes o f 1992-1994. Some, like the consensus 
historian Hartz, found popularity when their works coincided with mainstream cultural 
thought. Others, like Muzzey and Rugg, were criticized for taking unpopular perspectives 
that ran up against popular notions o f Americanism and tradition.
So too were the creators and supporters of the national history standards attacked by 
those defending what they saw as true American traditions and values.
This is the inescapable nature o f history when it enters the public arena. Those 
who write it are not only influenced by their own current cultural surroundings and 
assumptions on society as they research and write; but then once again they risk criticism 
and attack by those who hold opposing cultural assumptions after they are published.
This is one attribute that allows for lively debate in the field and keeps history fresh. 
However, it is also what allows vested political and cultural institutions to use history as a 
weapon of cultural manipulation by interested political and cultural institutions. This is 




On May 19, 1994, the National Council that oversaw the creation process of the 
history standards met for the last time in order to finalize the world and United States 
standards and send them off for publication. According to Ross Dunn and Gary Nash, 
two editors o f the standards who were present, almost everyone at the meeting supported 
this fifth re-edit o f standards, except Chester Finn.1 Finn had served as Assistant U.S. 
Secretary of Education between 1985 and 1988 under the Reagan Administration, and 
had been a critic o f the multicultural perspective in history throughout the development 
process. He worried that “political correctness and relativism rears its head in too many 
places,” and that the “usual manifestations of excessive attention to fashionable groups 
and obscure individuals who need to be there for proportional purposes,” took away from 
accurate, proper history education.2
No one other than Finn objected to the U.S. standards though; it was the world 
history standards that faced a larger challenge. Those who had advocated for a western- 
centered perspective from the beginning of the project once again pushed for a total 
revision o f the world standards. Everyone agreed that both sets o f standards would be 
published, with the understanding that they would encourage healthy debate amongst
1 Nash, Crabtree, Dunn, History on Trial, 180-181.
2 Chester E. Finn Jr,. “Notes for National Forum/National Council History Standards 
Discussion,” Washington, D.C., Education Policy Committee o f the Educational 
Excellence Network, May 19, 1994. As quoted in History on Trial, 180.
educators and possibly the public.3 Council members were not prepared for the kind of 
politically motivated debate that was waiting for them, however.
On October 20, 1994, the Wall Street Journal printed an op-ed piece by Lynne 
Cheney, former NEH chairwoman who approved the grant o f $525,000 the NEH awarded 
the NCHS to create the standards. In her essay, Cheney juxtaposed what she called 
“celebratory prose” for historical topics such as Mansa Musa and Africa to the critical 
emphases the documents showed for Americans like John D. Rockefeller and Joseph 
McCarthy.4 She counted 19 references to McCarthy or McCarthyism and 17 references to 
the Ku Klux Klan, and contrasted that to six references to Harriet Tubman, one reference 
to Ulysses S. Grant, and none to Robert E. Lee.5
Cheney argued these were glaring examples o f how liberal multiculturalists had 
hijacked the history standards and were trying to push an unpatriotic, left-wing revision 
o f history onto students. The “ 1992 presidential election unleashed the forces of political 
correctness. [...] those who were ‘pursuing the revisionist agenda’ no longer bothered to 
conceal their ‘great hatred for traditional history.’”6 She left the reader with an ominous 
prediction if nothing was done, “there is every reason to believe that the certification 
process put in place by the Clinton administration will lead to the adoption of the 
proposed standards more or less intact — as official knowledge — with the result that 
much that is significant in our past will begin to disappear from our schools.”7
3 Nash, Crabtree, Dunn, History on Trial, 183.
4 Lynne Cheney, “The End of History,” The Wall Street Journal, October 20, 1994. 





If these standards were grossly biased and unfair in their treatment o f American 
history, what did Cheney prescribe as proper historical curriculum? She referenced an 
earlier document published by the same center she was now criticizing, “Lessons From 
History,” released by the NCHS. Cheney claimed that the “Lessons” publication 
“conveys the notion that wealth sometimes has had positive cultural consequences in this 
country. [...] ‘Lessons’ is honest about the failings o f the U.S., but it also regularly 
manages a tone o f affirmation.”8 For Cheney, it appeared the problem with the standards 
was not that it was biased in general, but that it was biased in the wrong direction.
Cheney believed the history taught in schools should be patriotic and affirm that wealthy 
individuals are more helpful than hurtful, and individual initiative is a vital part of 
American identity. Good history “emphasized the individual greatness that has flourished 
within our political system and in our representative institutions.”9
In her argument for a glorified version of American history that put wealthy 
historical actors in a good light and would pay scant attention to racial and class conflicts, 
Cheney was really arguing for a culture that did the same. Her article was a way to 
portray liberals and Democrats as supporters o f multiculturalism, and for Cheney and 
many other conservatives this was a dangerous cultural ideology. It threatened the 
conception of America as being unified by republican values and mono-cultural, and so it 
had to be stopped. With the 1994 midterm elections rapidly approaching, the newly 
published history standards presented an opportunity for conservatives to try and 
convince the public that multiculturalism, and the liberals who supported it, were
8 Cheney, “The End o f History.”
9 Ibid.
attacking the real American way o f life; and thus, by de facto, the conservatives were 
defending it.
Cheney made the standards sound threatening and politically motivated by 
overlooking or omitting certain things. For example, eight o f the seventeen references to 
the Ku Klux Klan that Cheney counted were not in the standards themselves, but were 
actually included in one teaching activity. Eight others were also from teaching activities 
mentioned for different grades. Only one reference to the KKK was ever included in the 
actual standards.10 Cheney’s maneuver is known in debates and logic class as semantic 
ambiguity, and it rests on the interpretation o f individual words. In this case, Mrs. Cheney 
claimed the Ku Klux Klan and Senator McCarthy were mentioned suspiciously more 
often in the “standards” than traditional historical role models like Harriet Tubman and 
Robert E. Lee. But as noted above, her analysis didn’t differentiate between the teaching 
activities, a list of suggested questions and projects that accompanied the standards, and 
the actual standards. This ambiguity afforded Cheney the opportunity to make it appear to 
the reader as though the history standards were filled with pessimistic interpretations of 
America’s past, omitting the historical heroes many Americans had grown to love.
Semantic ambiguity aside, Cheney did not offer up any context surrounding how 
the words were used, or what historical issues the questions or statements that included 
those words addressed. She added numbers to loaded historical names and words, which 
gave a fa9ade of well done research, when really it was wrought with glaring ambiguities.
Cheney’s op-ed traced the roots of the problematic standards to the 1992 election 
o f President Clinton, which allegedly emboldened advocates o f multiculturalism to push
10 Nash, Crabtree, Dunn, History on Trial, 205.
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their ideological views into the history standards. Cheney quoted an unnamed insider 
who stated “Those who were ‘pursuing the revisionist agenda’ no longer bothered to 
conceal their ‘great hatred for traditional history.’” 11 Her insinuation was that behind this 
offensive cultural assault was the liberal establishment. She did not mention President 
Bush’s creation of America 2000, partly funding the creation of education standards in 
1991; or, how the NEH under her leadership initially funded the National Center for 
History in the Schools at UCLA in 1988, the program that would organize the standards’ 
development.12 These omissions revealed Lynne Cheney’s political intentions, making 
liberals the villains of her article and deflecting her and the Republicans’ role. By 
claiming the conflict was started by power drunk liberal interests, she appeared as a 
defender o f an American artifact under attack; rather than a political partisan using 
history to promote conservative values ahead of a midterm election.
A month earlier on September 27, 300 Republican candidates met on the steps of 
the Capitol and revealed the “Contract with America,” a document listing ten political 
promises signatories were making to the nation if voters granted them more power. 
Promises o f a mandatory balanced budget, a required 3/5 vote by Congress to raise taxes, 
a tax credit for parents and a reduction for married couples, lower capital gains tax rates, 
and other economically conservative reforms. The Contract noticeably avoided cultural 
issues. David Rosenbaum remarked the televised rally “had the flavor of a political 
convention. A band of retired military musicians played Sousa marches and college fight
11 Cheney, “The End of History,” http://www- 
personal.umich.edu/~mlassite/discussions261/cheney.html.
12 Nash, Crabtree, Dunn, History on Trial, 113.
songs.” 13 The ceremony was followed the next night with a fund raiser for Republican 
candidates, and the organized Republican strategy to retake the House hit the ground 
running.
Three weeks after the unveiling of Republicans’ Contract with America, and two 
weeks before the mid-terms, Cheney’s op-ed was published in the Wall Street Journal 
and opened the cultural front the Republicans had left out o f their Contract. The history 
standards provided an opportunity to portray liberal Democrats as cultural provocateurs 
who threatened to change the nation’s very identity, while keeping conservatives’ hands 
clean o f any cultural haranguing. The timing was perfect. With the elections just weeks 
away, and the conservatives poised to take the House of Representatives, conservatives 
were eager to attack liberals wherever they could.
It is hard to imagine that Cheney, former president o f the NEH, member of 
Lockheed Corporation’s Board o f Directors, and future senior fellow at American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, would knowingly allow an essay with 
such blatant misleading information to be published if her purpose was to offer it as 
honest analysis. However, using mass media to make a dubious argument has been a 
technique for swaying public sentiments. It has even been employed by government 
produced propaganda during times o f war and need. Creating red herrings and straw men, 
using circular reasoning or ad hominem attacks, all are time tested techniques to attack 
opponents or make suspicious arguments. Misleading language has been used by 
politicians in order to gain support or dodge liability; to control a conversation or sway
13 David E. Rosenbaum, “Republicans Offer Voters Deal for Takeover of House,” New 
York Times, September 28, 1994, A 16.
opinion. In firing the first shot across the bow, Lynne Cheney was declaring a political 
war, not a scholarly one.
The Attacks Spread
Between the end of October, 1994 and February, 1995, TV news, news radio, and 
op-eds blew up with arguments for and against the proposed history standards. Even after 
the Senate denunciation in January, the standards would make intermittent appearances as 
they were revised and rereleased in 1996. Shortly following Cheney’s op-ed in late 
October, conservative personalities took up arms against the proposed standards for U.S. 
and world history.
The attacks on the history standards spread to conservative Rush Limbaugh’s 
popular radio show four days after Cheney’s piece was published, and onto his television 
show four days after that. He lambasted the standards, saying they should be discarded 
“down the sewer o f multiculturalism.” 14 Between Rush Limbaugh’s radio and TV 
attacks, the Associated Press picked up on the buzz and featured an article in the New 
York Times on October 26 entitled, “Plan to Teach U.S. History is Said to Slight White 
Males.” The article presented the views of both critics and supporters o f the standards, 
and represented the controversy as objective and newsworthy. The strategic importance 
o f the article lies in the fact that it was presented as descriptive news, not an opinion
14 Transcript from Rush Limbaugh radio program, October 24, 1994, as quoted in History 
on Trial, Nash, Crabtree and Dunn, 5.
piece. This shows that the conservative critics’ politically motivated complaints were 
working in driving the controversy into a mainstream, legitimate debate.15
The conservative commentators hit the presses running. On November 4th, the day 
o f the midterm elections, Charles Krauthammer had an article printed in The Washington 
Post titled, “History Hijacked,” in which he claimed that the standards were bom out of 
good intentions by the Bush administration, but had been “hijacked by the educational 
establishment and turned into a classic o f political correctness.” 16 Krauthammer was 
using the same boogeyman that conservatives had been lambasting since the Powell 
Memorandum of 1971, when Lewis Powell wrote the Education Committee of the U.S. 
Chamber o f Commerce to warn o f a growing left-wing influence in American education. 
“The whole document strains,” he continued, “to promote the achievements and highlight 
the victimization o f the country’s preferred minorities, while straining equally to degrade 
the achievements and highlight the flaws of the white males who ran the country.”17 
Krauthammer, like Cheney and Limbaugh before him, drove home the same point: 
liberals and multiculturalists were trying to destroy America’s history by including new 
races and by not focusing as much on the traditional white heroes the adults of 1994 had 
grown up learning about.
Other conservative commentators made sure to chime in. John D. Fonte, future 
fellow at the conservative AEI and Hudson Institute, published a critical article entitled, 
“Rewriting History,” in the San Diego Union-Tribune on November 6th. Kim Weissman
15 Associated Press, “Plan to Teach U.S. History is Said to Slight White Males,” New 
York Times, October 26, 1994, B12.
16 Charles Krauthammer, “History Hijacked,” The Washington Post, November 4, 1994, 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/lP2-917518.html.
17 Krauthammer, “History Hijacked,” The Washington Post, as quoted in History on Trial 
(New York: Knopf, 1998), 190.
and J.D. Dampman sent Letters to the Editor, published on November 8 in the Wall Street 
Journal. And conservative columnist John Leo devoted his column in U.S. News &
World Report to criticizing the standards in an article titled, “The Hijacking of American 
History” on November 14.18
Four days after the Republicans took a majority in the House o f Representatives 
in the midterm elections, the Wall Street Journal published a fiery op-ed written by 
Balint Vazsonyi, renowned pianist and senior fellow at the little known Potomac 
Foundation, a conservative think tank. Titled, “History Thieves,” Vazsonyi mercilessly 
attacked the standards in a flamboyantly unfair fashion. Only citing Cheney’s article and 
her stated opinion of the standards, not the standards themselves, he decried them as 
being a product o f the same process pioneered by the Nazis and Bolsheviks in their 
attempt to brainwash populaces. “The recipe called for schools which dispense not 
knowledge, but a compendium of selected events, personalities and interpretations. [...] 
Because it has worked every time, it is this same recipe ‘National Standards’ seeks to 
dispense to America.”19 Balint went on to paint a picture of these standards as being the 
latest in a continued struggle by those who want to control the world and destroy Western 
civilization. The goal o f these horrible agents is to
deprive American consciousness of its solid foundations and remove 
forever the intractable impediments standing in the way of those who dream of a 
closed, regimented, controlled world. By divorcing the fruits o f Western 
civilization and of Anglo-American pragmatism from their roots, from the 
personalities and events which brought them forth, there will be no more need for 
battlefield victories.20
18 Nash, Crabtree, Dunn History on Trial, Notes on Chapter 8, 299.
19 Balint Vazsonyi, “The History Thieves,” America On My M ind  (Potomac Foundation, 
1996), http://balintvazsonyi.org/pdfs/americaonmvmind.pdf, originally published in the 
Wall Street Journal, “Fetters to the Editor,” November 8, 1994.
20 Vazsonyi, “The History Thieves,” America On My Mind.
By lumping Nazis, Communists and the National History Standards together, 
Balint indubitably attempted to make the reader equate the standards with other notable 
“evils” from history. It is an informal fallacy known in logic as a hasty generalization. He 
stated his assertion that these villains’ aim was to destroy the roots of the American 
identity as though it were fact, without presenting any evidence.
At no point in his tirade did Balint quote any part o f the standards. His article is 
fanciful and aimed to paint a picture of an impending monster created to gobble up 
American history. As with Mrs. Cheney’s article, his short essay is not meant to 
elucidate, but rather to incite.
Three days after Balint’s opinion essay was published, the world standards were 
released. The New York Times announced their release while acknowledging the 
growing divisiveness around them. “The historians who wrote the standards are well 
aware that their work may offer yet another opportunity for the culture wars to enter the 
high school arena, just as their American history standards did when released last 
month.”21 The author went on to note the political effect this controversy was having.
This week Under Secretary o f Education Marshall S. Smith, former dean 
o f the School o f Education at Stanford University, rejected Mrs. Cheney’s 
contention that the Clinton Administration would adopt the proposed standards as 
matters o f official knowledge. “We’re really trying to keep hands off,” he said, 
stressing that any national standards would be voluntary.22
Thomas’s article revealed more between the lines than just a hesitant Clinton 
administration. It revealed Cheney’s motives when it states that she had earlier 
contended, after her initial attack, that Clinton’s administration would adopt the standards 
as “official knowledge.” She intended to paint the Democrats as the villains behind the
21 Jo Thomas, “A New Guideline on History Looks Beyond Old Europe,” The New York 
Times, November 11, 1994, A22.
22 Ibid.
culturally explosive standards, tying them directly to the standards when it had actually 
been bipartisan in origin. And the effectiveness of the conservatives’ public attacks is 
shown in Mr. Smith’s insistence that the Democratic administration would not 
automatically adopt the standards, and stressed that they would be voluntary. Already by 
November 11, just three weeks after the initial attack in the Wall Street Journal, the 
standards’ were being considered a hot potato by the President’s administration.
The lack o f any insistence at the time that the attacks made on the standards by 
conservatives might be motivated by their newfound political power and their 
emboldened new leadership is striking. A reason for this could be how unexpected all this 
criticism was by the supporters. Another is that, while conservatives were using the 
standards to influence the cultural debate in the U.S., their counterparts on the left had 
had no such intentions. This is bore out in research on the standards debate.
In 1999, the journal Social Education published the results of a study performed 
by researchers Patricia Avery and Theresa Johnson. The two authors investigated ten 
newspapers to determine which interests were represented the most during the history 
standards debate. Out o f thirty-seven non-editorial articles, conservative spokespersons 
and groups represented 17% of quoted sources (the rest were either educators or 
government officials). While 17% may not seem high, it is important to note that the 
percent o f liberal organizations or spokespersons quoted was zero. “Their strong presence 
is interesting in itself,” the researchers noted, “but it is particularly noteworthy in the 
absence o f any balance from parallel liberal voices.”23 The absence of anything 
resembling a coherent defense from liberal groups, and the prevalence of a large public
23 Patricia G. Avery and Theresa Johnson, “How Newspapers Framed the U.S. History 
Standards Debate,” Social Education 63(4) (1999): 220-224.
conservative presence surrounding the issue, serve as more evidence that the debate was 
intended as a surprise attack by a number of conservatives to manipulate sensitive 
cultural issues at the time.
The Big Blow
On January 18, 1995, after much public debate over the history standards and 
whether they portrayed a distorted view of American history, the Senate voted 99-1, 
without having held a single hearing on the matter, in favor o f a legally non-binding 
resolution repudiating the standards. The resolution requested that any future history 
education guidelines “not be based on standards developed primarily by the NCHS prior 
to February 1, 1995.”24 It went on to say that any future guidelines that use government 
funds, “the recipient o f such funds should have a decent respect for U.S. history’s roots in 
Western civilization.”25
The lopsided vote had the appearance of bipartisan agreement. But in reality, the 
resolution was a rider amendment to a mandated budget bill, and was thrown in last 
minute. Many Democratic congressmen did not want to vote for it, but only upon the 
compromise to make it legally non-binding (in the hopes that it would not affect the 
standards), and to hurry the vote for the budget bill, they agreed to pass it.26
24 Nash, Crabtree, Dunn, History on Trial, 235.
25 Associated Press, “Senate Rejects Standards For Teaching History Western 
Civilization Presented Poorly, Gorton Resolution Says,” The Spokesman-Review, January 
19, 1995, http://www.spokesman.com/stories/1995/jan/19/senate-rejects-standards-for- 
teaching-history/.
26 Nash, Crabtree, Dunn, History on Trial, 231-237.
Two weeks later, this provision along with others that had been strapped to the 
Unfunded Mandates Bill were stripped, and thus the resolution condemning the standards 
was undone, but the damage wasn’t. The public had witnessed the debate unfold in 
newspapers and on television. Conservative critics had won the image war; they had 
shown that manipulating a perceived threat to a conservative conception o f American 
values and culture could stoke enough anger and stir up national attention. Riding the 
wave o f political success after their November victories, they now found a quick cultural 
success in the publicized defeat o f the national history standards.
The campaign against the standards was so successful that the Clinton 
Administration shied away from supporting them. The attacks on the standards had been 
so useful for effecting the cultural climate that eight months after the Senate vote, while 
an independent commission was busy reviewing and reworking the standards, the 
Secretary of Education Richard Riley still insisted that “The President and I do not think 
the history standards are the basis for a good curriculum in the schools.”27 This was quite 
a turnaround from the Administration’s full support of the standards through November 
o f 1994. It is clear the public controversy driven by conservative pundits had had its 
intended effect: garnering a cultural victory to buffer political power and weakening the 
image of their liberal opponents by defeating a landmark attempt at education reform.
As an independent committee approved by the Council for Basic Education 
scrambled to edit the standards through the spring o f 1995, the debate trickled on in the 
news media. After the January vote, those who had supported the standards, mostly 
educators and people involved in their development, wrote a number o f op-eds in an
27 Department o f Education Press Release, September 4, 1995, as quoted in Nash, 
Crabtree, Dunn, History on Trial, 246.
attempt to fix the tarnished image of their history standards. While a good number of op- 
eds and letters to the editors were published after January, there is now little doubt that 
the conservative attackers had done much of what they had come to do. By February of 
1995, the standards had been maligned, exaggerated, taken out of context and used as a 
multicultural boogeyman so effectively by some on the Right, that the hopes the creators 
o f the standards had had that the standards would radically change history education in 
America were dashed. The power o f cultural manipulation through mass media, as shown 
by a good handful o f conservative commentators, had been too powerful for the unwitting 
educators who had worked two years to develop a comprehensive set o f standards to be 
used to improve children’s grasp of their nation’s past.
CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION
Over thirty organizations had taken part in the development of the national history 
standards. As they were published in late 1994, twenty-nine of them officially supported the 
finished product. The outlier was the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), a labor union 
which was at this time under the conservative leadership of controversial education activist 
A1 Shanker. The AFT took up issue with the world history standards, believing them 
deficient on recent and European history, as well as arguing they paid little attention to the 
achievements o f the W est.1 So, when it came time to think about re-editing both standards 
after the Senate censure in January 1995, AFT representative Ruth Wattenberg had an idea. 
A day after the censure she wrote the director o f educational programs at the Pew Charitable 
Trusts, suggesting that perhaps individuals who had not been a part o f the original standards 
development should be given a chance at their revision. Specifically, she suggested these 
individuals should be “centrist and conservative historians.”2
In the aftermath o f the Senate resolution, this was a conscious request to effectively 
hand historical narrative and in part the shaping o f American identity over to a specific side 
of the political spectrum, with the aim of disseminating it to public schools nationwide. 
Robert Schwartz, the director Wattenberg wrote, disagreed. A review and possible revision 
of the national set o f history standards was instead awarded to the Council for Basic 
Education (CBE), a non-profit organization with both liberal and conservative membership,
1 History on Trial, 185.
2 Ruth Wattenberg to Robert Schwartz, 19 Jan. 1995; as quoted in History on Trial, 241.
whose main objective was to push for liberal arts education in schools. From June to October 
o f 1995, the CBE worked closely with the NCHS to determine ways in which the standards 
could be improved and made less contentious. While damage had been done to the public 
reputation o f the standards after they were censured and practically abandoned by the Clinton 
administration, at least its original developers could breathe a sigh o f relief that they, and not 
centrist and conservative historians alone, would have a say in the second finished product.
The Senate censure (and its much less noted removal) did not quiet the debate over 
the standards. It did, however, garner less public attention. The New York Times opinion 
pages serve as a window into the debate as well as evidence that there was a concerted 
attempt by a group to consciously steer the public conversation. O f the sixteen articles 
concerning the history standards (fourteen opinion pieces, two objective) printed in the New 
York Times alone between 1994 and 1997, nine of them were printed in a three month span 
between the January censure and April, 1995. In this span there was a coordinated effort by 
members o f the American Enterprise Institute’s Committee to Review National Standards to 
further attack the voluntary standards, and criticize any support for them expressed in the 
paper.
The increased back-and-forth over the national history standards now received less 
consideration by the public at large. The initial jabs conservatives had thrown at the 
standards had done their job. Now, as the scholarly debate ramped up and was acted out by 
sub-committees, op-eds and letters to the editor, the public’s attention would soon be drawn 
to other items connected to the 90’s culture wars: The O.J. Simpson murder trial and the 
Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing. The battle for history education and American 
identity would now be fought without much fanfare.
On January 26, eight days after the pivotal Senate resolution renouncing the standards, an 
article by Frank Rich was published in the New York Times opinion pages. Rich started his 
piece by contrasting the fate o f the NEH-funded history standards with the mystery o f O.J. 
Simpson’s innocence. “The mystery? This project was originally financed and guided by 
none other than Mrs. Cheney, who called it her ‘single most important legacy’ and her 
‘favorite grant’ before leaving the N.E.H. after the '92 election.”3 Rich was suspicious of 
Cheney’s motivation behind attacking the standards and her former agency. Was she acting 
out of personal conviction or, he questioned, “has she turned against her former agency so 
she can play her own starring role in the culture war that the far right hopes to ride to the 
White House?”4 Rich noted that days after Cheney’s first op-ed scathing the standards, Rush 
Limbaugh took it up as a reason to abolish the NEH. And here Cheney sat, just a week after 
the Senate voted not to federally certify the standards, using them as an excuse as to why the 
NEH is unnecessary and needed to be abolished. Perhaps Cheney’s vocal criticism of the 
standards up to this point, Rich suggested, was merely a way to capitalize on the newfound 
power of conservatives in government. Rich’s article would attract a swift response.
3 Frank Rich, “Eating Her Offspring,” The New York Times, January 26, 1995. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/26/opinion/joumal-eating-her-offspring.html. Accessed on 
March 3, 2015.
4 Ibid.
On January 30, Lynne Cheney responded to Rich’s opinion piece, declaring that it is 
“fraught with distortions.”5 She noted twice how polite she had been at the hearings, 
contrasting herself to the Democratic congressman David Skaggs, who dared suggest she had 
exaggerated some o f her previous claims concerning the standards. In her brief letter to the 
Editor, she explained how Rich had not accurately described her exchange with Skaggs; but 
never spoke to his main point, that her motivation since October had been purely political. 
She stood by her criticism of the standards and used the letter as an opportunity to poke at 
them again by reminding the readers that the Senate voted 99-1 against granting them federal 
certification. She did not mention that the resolution was merely a rider amendment to the 
Unfunded Mandates Bill, or that Democrats only voted for the amendment upon the 
agreement that it would have no binding legal force. Her motives behind keeping that 
information from the reader, one can only imagine. The Letter to the Editor notes that Lynne 
Cheney was a Distinguished Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).
Three days after Cheney’s editorial was published, two more appeared in the New 
York Times under the banner, “Let’s Look at Biases in the History Standards.” In one, Sandra 
Stotsky, research associate at Harvard’s Graduate School of Education, criticizes Frank 
Rich’s article for suggesting the standards are a “middle-of-the-road committee product.”6 
She suspiciously left out that Rich also called them “imperfect” and “voluntary to boot,” two 
important qualifiers. Selective quoting like that is a small way to control the appearance of 
one’s opponent.
5 Lynne Cheney, “History Standards Unsuitable for Schools,” The New York Times, January 
30, 1995. A18.
6 Sandra Stotsky, “Let’s Look at Biases in the History Standards,” The New York Times, Feb 
2, 1995. A22.
The main point o f Stotsky’s editorial was that the standards were clearly biased in the 
questions they asked students to consider. In the author’s analysis, they contained loaded 
phrases, loaded questions and one-sided questions that revealed a liberal bias for 
multiculturalism and America-bashing. For example, the standards asked
“What major grievances have been advanced by spokespersons for 
African-Americans, Asian-Americans, Hispanic Americans and native 
Americans?”, with no corresponding questions asking, for example, how 
Asian-Americans have advanced educationally and economically and the 
reasons for their inter-marriage rates.7
If Stotsky’s argument says anything, it is that a history book or teacher asking about 
the grievances different racial spokespersons in American history have had is a biased liberal 
question, if  not accompanied by a different question that makes sure to remind the student 
that some people have it better in America now. She also somehow equated the first question 
as being critical o f the U.S., despite no hint or supposition that any said grievance would be 
justified. Most surprising to Stotsky was how “so many academic historians, high school 
teachers and professional organizations created or approved such a biased document.”8 One 
concludes she seemingly could not understand it because what they created was not what she 
would have created on her own.
Accompanying that editorial was another written by Robert Costrell, professor of 
economics at the University of Massachusetts. Costrell set up his article as a response to 
Frank Rich’s, demanding that Rich’s claim that the standards were “middle o f the road” 
could not be supported. While Stotsky’s editorial mainly raised issues o f racial and social 
liberal bias in the standards, Costrell noted perceived leftist economic bias. While focused on
the standards’ treatment of the Great Depression’s causes, he noted “the standards' chief 
explanation o f the Depression is what they dub the ‘trickle down’ economics o f Calvin 
Coolidge.”9 Costrell concluded,
The standard is out of step with both Keynesian and monetarist 
research over the last few decades. The authors' focus on distributional 
issues has clouded their treatment of the Depression's causes, much as it 
has distorted the economic history elsewhere in this imbalanced 
document.10
It was a valid point. By not including other factors debated among historians as 
having a hand in the demise o f the 1920s market, the standards dropped a ball. But, as a 
response to Rich’s article this editorial lacked as well. Costrell did not acknowledge, just as 
Stotsky’s had been careful not to, that Rich’s description of the standards was not only 
“middle of the road,” but also “imperfect.”
Within the next two weeks, two editorials came out in support o f the standards. One 
published on February 6 was written by Earl P. Bell, then-president of the Organization of 
History Teachers, a group which had been directly involved in the creation o f the documents. 
He was cautious and tempered with any praise for the standards, supporting some revision 
but not total dismissal. He merely clarified that when the Senate had resolved not to federally 
certify them, it was with the understanding that “the Senate supports continuation of the work 
on the standards.” Bell quoted Senators Bingaman and Levin who had argued that the non­
binding Resolution will not destroy the project to develop history standards. Bell hoped that
9 Robert Costrell, “Let’s Look at Biases in the History Standards,” The New York Times, 
February 2, 1995. A22. http://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/02/opinion/l-let-s-look-at-biases- 
in-the-history-standards-skewed-economics-386895.html. Accessed on March 3, 2015.
10 Ibid.
“these clarifying statements document recognition that the future o f history in the schools 
depends on the successful completion o f this project.”11
So far The New York Times had not heard much from the supporters o f the standards, 
only predominantly from its critics. That changed on February 13, when the editorial board 
got involved with the debate. Written by an editor, the paper published an opinion piece 
entitled, “Maligning the History Standards,” stating the paper’s stance on the issue. Noting 
the intense conservative criticisms the standards had received, The New York Times declared 
that any point they may have is small and misleading. “Reading the standards and support 
materials is exhilarating. Students will rejoice in learning from them; teachers will cherish 
using them.”12 The paper’s editors celebrated not only the standards themselves, but even the 
sample lessons that accompany them. The author then took note, just as Rich had, of the 
misleading tone of Cheney throughout the debate, and argued she “ridicules through 
misrepresentation. ”
Enumeration -  McCarthy 19, Edison 0 -  would make sense if the 
standards were a textbook, a compendium of all important facts. But the 
sample lessons, from which the numbers are taken, are just that. Samples.
Teachers would fill in the blanks - 13
The real problem with the standards, the editors of The New York Times argued, was 
that it may have been too ambitious; asking for classroom activities like mock trials, debate, 
and students doing lots o f original research is a lot to cram into limited class time. “Yet if  this
11 Quotes in this paragraph were taken from Earl P. Bell, “Senate Wants History Panel to 
Proceed,” New York Times, February 6, 1995. A16.
12 “Maligning the History Standards,” The New York Times, February 13, 1995. A18.
13 Ibid.
Government-sponsored project errs by demanding too much, that in itself might herald a 
welcome change for American’s primary and secondary schools.” 14
The Gray Lady had spoken. A classic standard in American news had not only sided 
with the standards, but had also criticized the bulk of conservative condemnations as 
overblown, and had personally called out Lynne Cheney for misrepresenting what was 
actually found in the standards. Such a blow in favor o f the standards would not go 
unanswered by their critics.
Almost a week later, John Fonte, Historian and ally of Mrs. Cheney’s, responded to 
the paper’s editorial with a short piece entitled, “Flawed History Standards Must Go.” Fonte 
claimed the editors o f The New York Times had not admitted how much liberal bias is 
actually inserted into the standards. The “problem is bias, exclusion and just plain bad 
history, on practically every page o f both the United States and world history standards.” 15 
To back up his claim, Fonte quoted Albert Shanker, then-president of the AFT, the only 
major organization that had been a part of the standards’ development and which had 
officially come out against them from the start. “America may be the first nation,” Fonte 
quoted him as saying, “to teach a history that ‘leaves its children feeling negative about their 
own country.’”16 The use o f Shanker, president of a teacher’s union, was a subtle maneuver 
by Fonte to give the appearance that even left leaning organizations were against the 
standards. However, Shanker was controversial in the world of unions and was certainly no 
leftist. In fact, throughout the whole development process, he and the AFT had lobbied for a
14 Ibid.
15 John Fonte, “Flawed History Standards Must Go,” The New York Times, February 19, 
1995. E12.
16 Ibid.
more conservative, western-centric view o f U.S. and world histories. But o f course, the 
public at large was not well acquainted with these important details. Fonte mainly argued that 
the debate was not conservative v. liberal, but rather “objectivity versus bias.” He concluded 
by driving home his point that there was no hope of “revising a fundamentally flawed 
document. U.C.L.A.’s history standards must go.” 17
Again, one sees an immediate response to any sign of media support for the 
standards. One also should note Fonte’s insistence on calling the standards “U.C.L.A.’s” to 
fog the documents in a film o f liberal California; and also trying to rally Americans of all 
brands against the standards by denying it was ever conservative versus liberal, and by 
quoting both Republican and Democratic congressmen.
The most important thing to note out o f these editorial exchanges between Rich and 
The New York Times editors on the one hand and Cheney, Stotsky, Costrell and Fonte on the 
other is not so much the arguments between them, but the connection between the latter four. 
It is no coincidence that these four individuals would have editorials published around the 
same time criticizing the history standards, a partial product o f the NEH, as the federal 
government debated the pros and cons o f abolishing that same organization during the dawn 
o f a conservative reign on Capitol Hill. It was part o f a conscious effort by an organization of 
conservatives to rouse cultural passions and score political capital at a crucial point in time. 
That organization was the American Enterprise Institute.
The AEI had recently formed the Committee to Review National Standards. The 
woman who chaired it was also the woman to fire the first shot across the bow on October 
20, 1994, Mrs. Lynne V. Cheney. And the Executive Director o f that committee was none
other than John Fonte. Attacks by them and conservative allies in the media and academia 
had done well to stoke enough public outrage in different newspapers, on talk radio and even 
television to lead to the Senate Resolution of January 18. Then, on January 26, Frank Rich 
opened up a front in the New York Times, a paper that had stayed relatively quiet in the 
debate up until now, with his short article calling out Cheney for what appeared to be an 
obvious political motivation for her sudden cultural crusade. Within a few days, the editors of 
the opinion page had received letters from Cheney, Stotsky and Costrell; each of whom were 
members o f the AEI’s committee, and each of them attacked the standards. Then, The New 
York Times came out publicly in favor of the standards being used in schools. Not 
surprisingly, six days later John Fonte, Director o f that same committee, responds criticizing 
the standards and framed the debate practically as America versus anti-American bias. It is 
clear the four editorial responses were coordinated by the AEI committee in response to a 
perceived public defense of the standards. Rich and the editorial staff had touched a nerve 
with a conservative think tank determined to see the standards defeated.
Wrapping It up
This is clear evidence that what developers and supporters of the standards were 
facing was not a spontaneous eruption of criticisms bom out o f the interest of actual 
education reform; but rather an arranged attack by political actors with ulterior motivation to 
portray the standards in an unflattering light. The reasons for doing so had been two-fold: in 
the short-term, it would afford conservatives in government fodder in their fight to abolish 
the NEH. They could hold up the discredited standards, pointing out that the NEH is the
organization responsible for such bias trash ruining children’s education and sense of 
patriotism. In the long term, it was another battle in the culture wars, a chance to swing 
public opinion to the right when it came to issues o f American identity. This cultural struggle 
over what it means to be American has been raging since the pro-French and pro-British 
debates o f the post-Revolutionary War period; and it has continued long after the national 
history standards debate. But we can now see how this episode in our history was clearly 
used as a means to effect cultural debate, and in so doing, effect the political climate.
We know that the conservative goal of abolishing the NEH did not succeed. Whether 
the national history standards debate paid off for conservatives in the long term is up to 
historians o f the future to debate if they wish. What is apparent is that in the short term, their 
efforts had succeeded in killing off an attempt at history education reform, and thus a chance 
to challenge or reshape American identity, a concept that had been slowly fracturing and 
splintering already.
On April 19, 1995, the Oklahoma City Federal Building was bombed and questions 
o f whether battles over our culture and the role of Government had gone too far quieted the 
culture war for a short time. The debate over the standards became muted in the media. When 
the NCHS re-released the standards in 1996 after making reforms suggested by the CBE 
(mainly consisting o f dropping the sample lessons), a few op-eds were published, but most of 
them were celebratory. The battle had ended. The re-released standards were not met with 
much fanfare, and did not become the big success the developers had hoped the original 
documents would.
What is now an almost forgotten small chapter in the history o f education reform is 
more important than first meets the eye. This thesis has shown it to be a window into how
cultural manipulation can be a conscious act by prominent and influential individuals, just as 
cultural pessimists like T. J. Lears have described. This paper reveals the pivotal role 
individuals at the AEI played in combating the standards and portraying them negatively in 
the media, and conservatives were able to effectively steer a public conversation about our 
nation’s education and cultural values in their favor, if  only for a brief moment.
The national history standards controversy was an example o f Gramscian theories of 
culture at work. Cheney and other conservatives used the cultural symbol o f history as a 
political function in an attempt to effect sympathy and gamer political capital at a watershed 
moment in congressional history.
The standards’ developers had hoped to revamp the outdated history still taught in 
many classrooms in the 1990s. A history of mainly white men, o f Consensus Theory from 
the 1950s. No one had expected their attempts at reform to be hijacked by political players 
with an agenda. But this episode shows us that it can happen, and often does. As much as we 
like to think culture is just an organic outgrowth o f a people with shared values, the national 
history standards controversy can reveal just how easily, with a pluck of a single chord, that 
sense o f shared culture can be thrown into tumult and be used by those in power.
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